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Sliding Backwards: The Impact of California
Evidence Code Section 1108 on Character
Evidence, Rape Shield Laws and the Presumption
of Innocence
Celia McGuinness*
The last twenty years have seen striking changes in the law of character evidence in criminal trials. For hundreds of years, common law prohibited the use of character evidence against a defendant in a criminal
trial. 1 It was believed that although character evidence may be relevant, it
was so prejudicial that its introduction would deny the defendant a fair
trial. 2 When a woman complained of rape, however, common law allowed
the defendant to use her sexual character against her. 3 It was considered
relevant to show her "character for unchastity," i.e., "her propensity to engage in consensual sexual relations outside of marriage.,,4
In the 1970s, rape shield laws dramatically changed that position.
These laws prohibited the use of a rape complainant's sexual history ex5
cept under limited circumstances. The laws protected women and refocused the case on proving the defendant's guilt rather than proving the
complainant's morality.
In 1995, another dramatic change occurred. California, following the
federal system's lead, 6 enacted section 1108 of the California Evidence
7
Code. It enables prosecutors to use a defendant's history of sexual bad

*Celia McGuinness is a trial attorney at the San Francisco Public Defender's Office. She is
currently a Visiting Clinical Professor at the University of San Francisco Law School,
teaching the Criminal Law Clinic during the spring semester, 1998.
1. See generally 1 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 334 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing
the universal rule against character evidence).
2. See id.
3. See Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
Proposalfor the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 830-48 (1986).
4. /d. at 765-66.
5. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1l03(c) (West 1995); CAL. EVID. CODE § 782 (West 1995).
All subsequent statutory references are to the California Evidence Code, unless otherwise
stated.
6. See S. COMM. CRIM. PROC., COMM. REp., A.B. 882, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995)
[hereinafter CRIM. PROC. REPORT1.
7. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West Supp. 1997).
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acts to show his propensity to commit a sex crime. 8 Never before has
character evidence been admitted to show that the defendant is the kind of
person who would commit the crime with which he is charged. As with
rape shield laws, the stated purpose of this change was to aid victims of
9
sexual assault. In actuality, the law does great injustice both to complainants and to defendants in sex crime cases.
The law eliminates the protection against conviction for who you are,
not what you did. It makes any evidence of any prior sex crimes admissilO
ble. It places almost no limit on the nature of the prior act which may be
used. 11 It requires no similarity to the offense charged. 12 The prior act
need not have resulted in a conviction or even an arrest. 13 A mere allegation is enough.14 The evidence may be used in the prosecution's case in
chief; the prosecutor need not wait until the defendant raises his good
character. 15
Section 1108 also endangers the advances made by rape shield laws for
complainants in sex crimes. Although section 1108 is intended to aid victims of sex crimes, it reflects an attitude which rape shield laws were supposed to have squelched: the attitude that a woman's credibility is insufficient to sustain a criminal complaint. Moreover, it endangers the rape
shield laws themselves. The constitutional infirmities inherent in section
1108 may undermine the protections of rape shield laws upon which
women have come to rely. The dramatic changes in the law of character
evidence will, in this case, turn out to be a step backwards.
This article first explains the nature and goals of laws prohibiting the
use of character against the defendant. Part I and IT describe how rape
shield laws provided similar protections to complainants in sex crimes.
Part ill describes section 1108, which explicitly allows character evidence
against a defendant in almost every sex-related crime. Part IV points out
how the new law is a step backwards in protecting women. It emphasizes
the risk that the statute will cause innocent people to be convicted. Finally,
it demonstrates how section 1108 violates the constitutional principles of
fundamental fairness and reciprocity, which may weaken the rape shield
laws we now take for granted.

8. See id.
9. See ASSEMBLY COMM. ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMM. REP., AB. 882, 1995-96 Reg. Sess.

3 (Cal. 1995) [hereinafter PUBLIC SAFETY REPORT].
10. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108.
11. See id.
12. See id.

13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
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I. THE COMMON LAW DISPARITY: THE USE OF
CHARACTER EVIDENCE WAS PROHIBITED AGAINST
DEFENDANTS BUT ADMITTED AGAINST COMPLAINANTS
IN SEX CRIMES
A. DEFENDANTS

Character evidence means evidence of a person's moral character: the
16
propensity to do something because of the kind of person one is. Before
section 1108 was enacted, the prohibition against the prosecution's introduction of character evidence in its case in chief was "the universal rule."l7
If prior crimes evidence was admitted, "[t]he prosecutor could not argue,
nor could the court instruct, that the jury could consider such evidence to
prove the defendant's character (as opposed to some valid, non-character
purpose), let alone that proof of the defendant's character could be used to
prove the defendant's guilt in the current offense.,,18
The exception was codified in Evidence Code section 1102, which
provides that evidence of the defendant's character is admissible only if
offered by the defendant or the prosecution to rebut character evidence offered by the defendant. 19 The prosecution may not introduce the defendant's character in its case in chief.
Character evidence is excluded because of its inflammatory effect on
20
juries. Witkin states: "[s]uch evidence is some indication of the likelihood of [the defendant's] guilt and is therefore relevant, but it would be
highly prejudicial in its tendency to draw the attention of the jury away
from the evidence dealing with the crime charged. ,,21 One aspect of the

16. See WITKIN, supra note 1.
17. Id.
18. Albert J. Menaster, The Floodgates Have Opened, 23 CAL. Arr'ys FOR CRIM. JUST.
F., 1996, at 44. California allows the admission of prior bad acts against a defendant if
relevant to prove some disputed issue in the case. Evidence Code section 11 0 1(b) allows it
for motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or
accident, "or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or an attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that the victim
consented .... " CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b) (West 1995). Of course, courts have the discretion to exclude the evidence if it is more prejudicial than probative. See CAL. EVID.
CODE § 352 (West 1995). Recently, the courts have expanded the rules to broaden the circumstances in which such prior crimes evidence is admissible. See People v. Balcom, 7
Cal. 4th 414, 422 (1994); People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th 380, 404 (1994). The practical effect
has been to make almost all prior bad acts admissible against a defendant to prove some
point at issue. Since intent is almost always at issue, it has become very easy for prosecutors to use a defendant's prior act to show his intent in the new offense. The proscription
against using prior bad acts explicitly to show character remains, however.
19. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1102 (West 1995).
20. See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 194 (3d ed. 1940).
21. WITKIN, supra note 1.
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presumption of innocence is the fundamental axiom that the accused must
22
be tried only for what he did, not for who he is.
As will be argued below, evidence of the defendant's past acts may
prove little or nothing about his propensity to commit the current crime.
The proof of whether someone committed a crime lies in the evidence of
the incident itself, not in whether he is the kind of person who might be
capable of committing a crime. The danger of character evidence is that it
distracts the jury from judging the real, physical, direct and circumstantial
evidence of a crime, and instead leads to a judgment of the defendant himself. In my practice, I have seen that jurors' verdicts may, consciously or
subconsciously, tum on whether or not they liked the defendant. Jurors
may acquit, not from an overt desire to excuse someone they like, but
rather from the natural inclination to be more skeptical of evidence against
a person whom they consider worthy of protection. In the minds of jurors,
the legal presumptions of innocence and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are often construed more strictly in favor of a person who is
considered a good person, or at least, not a bad one.
B.

COMPLAINANTS

Although character evidence against defendants has always been excluded, the character of a woman who complained of sexual assault was
traditionally fair game. 23 A woman's character for sexual conduct was
considered highly relevant and probative of two things: her likelihood to
consent to sex and her character for truthfulness in general. 24 A woman
who said yes to sex before was considered likely to say yes again. 25 A
woman who was sexually experienced had loose morals and, therefore,
was generally considered less credible. 26
Naturally, having one's morals attacked on the witness stand is a humiliating experience. Anyone, no matter how injured, would be hesitant to
expose herself to a trial of her past. 27 Moreover, the rule allowing the victim's sexual character into evidence promoted the idea that there are two
22. See United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517,523 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
23. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 150 Cal. App. 2d 594,601 (1957).
24. See Garth E. Hire, Holding Husbands and Lovers Accountable for Rape: Eliminating
the "Defendant" Exception of Rape Shield Laws, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 591,
593-94 (1996); Galvin, supra note 3.
25. "[AJ woman who has previously consented to an act of sexual intercourse would be
more likely to consent again to such an act, thereby negating the charge that force and violence were used against her in order to accomplish the rape." Walker, 150 Cal. App. 2d at
601.
26. "[P]revious intercourse with other persons may be shown, as tending to disprove the
allegation of force, and such evidence would seem to be highly proper, as it must be obvious
to all that there would be less probability of resistance upon the part of one already debauched in mind and body, than there would be in the case of a pure and chaste female."
People v. Benson, 6 Cal. 221, 223 (1856).
27. See Hire, supra note 24.
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kinds of women: "good" women who deserve protection by the jury system
and "bad" women who do not. 28

II. RAPE SHIELD LAWS MADE THE COMPLAINANT'S
SEXUAL CHARACTER IRRELEVANT
Beginning in the 1970' s, California and most other jurisdictions en29
acted evidentiary rules popularly known as Rape Shield laws. California
enacted two statutes, sections 11 03(c) and 782 of the California Evidence
Code. 30 Section 11 03(c) makes evidence of prior sexual conduct by a
31
Section
complaining witness inadmissible to prove that she consented.
782 allows evidence of prior sexual conduct to attack a complainant's
credibility only if the defense makes a sworn offer of proof concerning its
relevance and the court holds a relevancy hearing outside the presence of
32
·
t he JUry.
Even if a defendant offers the sworn proof and affirmatively proves
relevance, the court may nevertheless exclude sexual conduct evidence as
more prejudicial than probative. 33 Courts caution that the relevance asserted must relate to credibility only and not to consent. "Great care must
be taken to insure that this exception to the general rule barring evidence
of a complaining witness's prior sexual conduct ... does not impermissibly encroach upon the rule itself and become a 'back door' for admitting
otherwise inadmissible evidence.,,34
Thus, courts have supported the policy behind the rape shield laws
even when defense attorneys look for creative ways around it. For example, in People v. Steele, the defendant was accused of raping, in his car, a
woman whom he had just met. 35 The defense sought to introduce evidence
that the woman had, at an earlier date, had sex in a car with another man

28. "The historical rule allowing the evidence [of complainants' sexual history] may be
more a creature of the one-time male fantasy of the 'girls men date and the girls men marry'
than one of logical inference." People v. Blackburn, 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 690-91 (1976).
29. See Galvin, supra note 3, at 765,830-48; Peter M. Hazelton, Rape Shield Laws:
Limits on Zealous Advocacy, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 35, 36 (1991).
30. California also passed two statutes concerning jury instructions in rape and related
sexual offense cases. Penal Code section 1127(d) prohibits judges from instructing juries
that consent in the past is proof of consent in this instance or that prior sexual conduct in
and of itself is proof of credibility of the complaining witness. CAL. PENAL CODE § lI27(d)
(West 1995). Section lI27(e) prohibits use of the hackneyed phrase "unchaste character."
CAL. PENALCODE§ 1127(e) (West 1995).
31. CAL. EVID. CODE § 11 03( c)( 1). This prohibition applies to conduct with people other
than the defendant; conduct with the defendant remains admissible under section
1103(c )(2).
32. CAL. EVID. CODE § 782.
33. See People v. Rioz, 161 Cal. App. 3d 905,916-17 (1984).
34. !d. at 918-19.
35. People v. Steele, 210 Cal. App. 3d 67, 69-70 (1989).
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she had just met. 36 The defense argued that it was evidence of the
woman's modus operandi, which is a standard use of prior bad acts evidence. 37 What the defense was really trying to prove was that "she did it
before, therefore, she would do it again." The California Supreme Court
ruled that the fact that the woman had done something before under similar
circumstances did not prove her modus operandi. 38 Just because she had
said yes before did not prove that she said yes this time. The evidence was
not admitted. 39

ill. THE NEW LAW: EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1108
After the advent of rape shield laws, the status of character evidence
for both victims and defendants was in balance. The defense could not use
a complainant's sexual character against her and the prosecution could not
use a defendant's sexual character against him. Section 1108, enacted in
1995, changed all that. It allows the prosecution to use evidence of prior
sex -related crimes to show a defendant's propensity to commit the crime
4o
with which he is currently charged. Now, the assumption, "she did it before, therefore she would do it again" applies to defendants.
The essential language of the statute is: "In a criminal action in which
the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's
commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible
by section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to section
352.,,41 Once the reader works out the double negative, it appears to mean
36. See id. at 72-73.
37. See id. at 76; see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b).
38. See Steele, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 76.
39. See id.
40. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108.
41. The entire statute reads:
1108. (a) In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.
(b) In an action in which evidence is to be offered under this section, the people shall
disclose the evidence to the defendant, including statements of witnesses or a summary of
the substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered, at least 30 days before the
scheduled date of trial or at such later time as the court may allow for good cause.
(c) This section shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of evidence under any other section of this code.
(d) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(l) "Sexual offense" means a crime under the law of a state or of the United States
that involved any of the following:
(A) Any conduct proscribed by Section 243.4, 261, 261.5, 262, 264.1, 266c, 286,
288, 288a, 288.2, 288.5, or 289, or subdivision (b), (c), or (d) of Section 311.2, or Section
311.3, 311.4, 311.10, 311.11, 314, or 647.6 of the Penal Code.
(B) Contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant's body or an object
and the genitals or anus of another person.
(C) Contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of the defendant and any
part of another person's body.
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that there is no limitation-Dther than section 352-to the possible uses of
other crimes evidence concerning sexual offenses. In its reference to section 1101, which prohibits character evidence, the statute by its terms
permits the use of prior sex-related offenses as proof of the defendant's
character: his predisposition to commit the crime with which he is charged.
Lest there be any doubt that the legislature intended to permit character
evidence to show predisposition, the legislative history is explicit. The
Legislative Counsel's Digest summarizes the bill as follows:
Existing law provides that, except as specified, evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the
form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific
instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to
prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.
This bill would create a further exception to this rule by providing
that in a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a
sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another
sexual offense or offenses is not inadmissible under the above rule,
except as speci'f'Ie d. 42
The Assembly Digest of the bill states, "[e]vidence admitted under this
new section would be subject to rational assessment by a jury as evidence
concerning the probability or improbability that the defendant has been
falsely or mistakenly implicated in commission of [sic] charged offense. ,,43
The author himself, James Rogan (R-Glendale), is quoted in the bill's
44
analyses by the Senate Committee on Criminal Procedure. In this report,
he explains:
Under current law, evidence that a particular defendant has committed rape, acts of child molestation, or other sexual offense
against other victims is not necessarily admissible in a trial where
the defendant is being accused of a subsequent sexual offense.
The propensity to commit sexual offenses is not a common attribute among the general public. Therefore, evidence that a particular
defendant has such a propensity is especially probative and should
(D) Deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily injury, or physical pain on another person.
(E) An attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in this paragraph.
(2) "Consent" shall have the same meaning as provided in Section 261.6 of the Penal
Code, except that it does not include consent which is legally ineffective because of the age,
mental disorder, or developmental or physical disability of the victim. CAL. EVID. CODE §
1108.

42. A.B. 882, 1995-96 Reg. Sess., CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST (Cal.
1995),
43. PUBLIC SAFETY REPORT, supra note 9, at l.
44. James Rogan, CRIM. PRoc. REPORT., supra note 6, at 2.
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be considered by [the trier] of fact when determining the credibility of a victim's testimony. This proposal will amend the Evidence
Code so as to establish, in sexual offense actions, a presumption of
admissibility for evidence that the defendant has committed similar
crimes on other occasions. 45
Significantly, the statute does not require that a defendant have been
convicted previously of a sex-related crime. Nor does it require an arrest.
The mere fact of the previous allegation is admissible to show that he has
the character of a sex offender. Gossip, in the form of reputation or opinion, may be sufficient.
What prior sex-related crimes does the statute permit? Nearly any
kind. The statute specifically makes twenty-one offenses admissible, including pornography distribution offenses, as well as violent acts.46 It includes offenses which are misdemeanors and wobblers, i.e., crimes that
may be charged either as a felony or as a misdemeanor. 47 For example,
knowing development, duplication, or exchange of any video or photograph depicting sexual conduct by a minor; indecent exposure; and annoying or molesting a child under age eighteen are all misdemeanors for the
48
Several of the other pornography distribution offenses,
first offense.
such as distribution of lewd material to a minor, are wobblers, as are sexual batte~ and statutory rape--consensual sex with a person under age
4
eighteen. Eight of the listed statutes require no physical contact whatso50
ever.
Additionally, section 1108 sweeps most other criminal sexual conduct
under its ambit by including "[c]ontact, without consent, between any part
of the defendant's body or an object and the genitals or anus of another
person" and "[c]ontact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of
the defendant and any part of another person's body.,,51 As the Senate Judiciary Committee pointed out, "the inclusion of these acts are already
covered under sexual battery and therefore seem redundant.,,52
Section 1108 also permits evidence of acts "[d]eriving sexual pleasure
or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily injury, or physical pain
on another person," 53 which appears to make evidence of sadomasochistic
45.
46.
47.
48.

/d.

See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (d)(1)(A).
See id.
See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EVIDENCE IN CIVIL TRIALS-ADMISSIBILITY OF A

CRIMINAL CONVICTION BASED UPON EVIDENCE WHICH IS INADMISSIBLE IN A CIVIL PROCEEDING, S. JUDICIARY COMM. REp., A.B. 882, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. 3-4 (Cal. 1995)
[hereinafter S. JUDICIARY REPORT].

49. See id.
50. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (d)(1)(A).
51. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1108 (d)(1)(B) and (C).

52. S. JUDICIARY REpORT, supra note 48, at 10.
53. CAL. EVID. CODE § l108(d)(1)(D).
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practices admissible. Finally, it ends with a catchall provision for "[a]n
54
attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct" described in the statute.
Section 1108 does not require that the previous bad conduct have any
similarity to the offense for which the defendant is currently on trial. An
Assembly Committee Report stated that "[t]his legislation would not generally authorize the admission of evidence of other 'bad acts' by the defendant, but only evidence of criminal sexual offenses of the same type as
those with which he is formally charged.,,55 Yet, the Senate Judiciary
Committee Analysis noted, "[t]he text of the measure itself, however, does
not restrict the introduction into evidence of 'similar' crimes.,,56 The Judiciary Committee Analysis then queried, "[s]hould not the measure be
narrowed to allow the admissibility of similar sexual offenses?,,57
The bill was never amended. It passed into law without any restrictions on the nature of the evidence which may be admitted. As the Senate
Judiciary Committee report concluded, "[t]he measure makes the value
judgment that an alleged misdemeanor indecent exposure incident is evidence of the character of a defendant who is charged with spousal rape or
sodomy.,,58
Three advisory committees of the U.S. Judicial Conference unanimously ~posed the language and intent of section 1108 in the federal
5
context. Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 are almost identical to section 1108. 60 The U.S. Judicial Conference Committees on Evidence,
Criminal Rules and Civil Rules each reviewed Federal Rules of Evidence
61
413-415. The Judicial Conference Report stated:
It is important to note the highly unusual unanimity of the
members of the Standing and Advisory Committees, composed of over 40 judges, practicing lawyers, and academicians, in taking the view that Rules 413-415 are undesirable. Indeed, the only supporters of the Rules were
representatives of the Department of Justice. 62

IV. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW LAW
Aside from supplanting years of jurisprudence which prohibited char-

54. CAL. EVID. CODE § l108(d)(1)(E).
55. PUBLIC SAFETY REpORT, supra note 9, at 2.
56. CRIM. PROC. REPORT, supra note 6, at 9.
57. Id. at 10.
58. Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added).
59. See CRIM. PROC. REPORT, supra note 6, at 5.
60. FED. R. EVID. §§ 413-415 (1997).
61. See CRIM. PROC. REPORT, supra note 6, at 5.
62. Judicial Conference Submits Report on New Evidence Rules, 56 CRIM. L. REP.
(BNA) No. 19, at 1455 (Feb. 15, 1995).
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acter evidence per se, section 1108 poses three serious problems. First, it
revives the corroboration requirement in rape cases, or at least provides an
excuse not to prosecute cases where the defendant has no history of sexrelated crimes. Second, it increases the risk of convicting the innocent.
Finally, it violates due process, creating a constitutional infirmity which
may jeopardize our current rape shield laws.
A. A CHALLENGE TO WOMEN'S CREDIBILITY
As late as 1972, fifteen states required corroboration of a complain63
ant's testimony in order to sustain a rape conviction. Some required corrob oration of each material element: force, penetration, and the identity of
the accused. 64 Others required corroboration by "material facts and circumstances which tend to support the testimony of the complainant. ,,65
Three rationales were generally given to justify the corroboration requirement: the emotion raised in a jury by a rape charge, the difficulty of
disproving a rape charge, and the frequency of false rape charges. 66 The
first rationale raises the concern that in a rape case, jurors will be unable to
retain their impartiality. Because of the nature of the offense and from
sympathy for a "wronged female," the jury may rush to convict.67 This ra68
tionale is belied by the low conviction rate for sex offenses. Yet, implicit
is the idea that a conviction on merely the complainant'S word would be
unjust. A conviction on her word alone would be a conviction on insufficient evidence.
The second justification-that rape charges are difficult to defend
against because there are rarely independent witnesses 69-also reveals
hesitance to believe a complainant. It is indeed difficult to defend a charge
when the only witnesses are the defendant and the complainant. But that
holds true of many offenses for which there is no corroboration requirement. 70 A late-night mugging may well have no other witnesses. "The
corroboration requirement, in effect, is a prior determination that if the
prosecution's case stands solely on the testimony of the complainant, the

63. See Donald J. Friedman, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform,
81 YALEL.J.1365, 1367-70(1972).
64. See id.at 1369-70.
65. See id.at 1369. A cautionary instruction, that "in prosecutions for sex offenses, accusations are easy to make and difficult to disprove, and the testimony of complaining witnesses should be examined with caution," has been approved well into the 1970's. See
People v. Merriam, 66 Cal. 2d 390, 394 (1967); People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864,
874 (1975).
66. See Friedman, supra note 63, at 1373.
67. See id. at 1378.
68. See id. at 1379.
69. See id. at 1382-84.
70. Corroboration was required at common law for perjury charges but for no other offense. See id. at 1366.
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defendant shall win.,,71 In other words, without corroboration, a prosecution should not prevail.
The third rationale, the prevalence of false accusations,72 simply states
more explicitly what the other two rationales imply: without corroboration,
we cannot trust that a woman is telling the truth. This justification maintains that a woman is likely to make false rape charges from shame or to
protect her reputation after having consensual sex; to shield another man
who has made her pregnant; from hatred; for blackmail; or for simple notoriety.73 "Psychiatrists [attribute false rape allegations] to the fact that for
some women it is better to be raped than ignored.,,74
The corroboration requirement is gone but not forgotten. These laws
have been repudiated for the most part. Some states, however, still require
corroboration if the victim's testimony is impeached or incredible. 75
While they existed, these corroboration laws did a great disservice: "a rape
trial involved a systematic process of disqualification of the complainant's
story.,,76 The legacy of rape corroboration requirements "casts a shadow,
in that the law still suggests that rape cases and r~e complainants occupy
a separate category when it comes to credibility.,,7
Why should a woman's testimony need corroboration? Legalistic rationales aside, Susan Estrich suggests that the corroboration requirement
arose in '''response to a man's nightmarish fantasy of being charged with
simple rape' and the 'institutionalization of the law's distrust of women
victims through rules of evidence and procedure.'" 78
Section 1108 appears to revive that nasty fantasy. Underlying section
1108 is the attitude that a woman's word is insufficient. Section 1108
implies that a woman's testimony cannot secure a conviction standing on
its own. Look again at Senator Rogan's comment: "[E]vidence that a particular defendant has such a propensity [to commit sexual offenses] ...
should be considered by [the trier] of fact when determining the credibility
of a victim's testimony.,,79 The Assembly Committee on Public Safety
71. Id. at 1382.
72. See id. at 1373-78.
73. See id. at 1373.
74. Id. at 1373 n.60. As a criminal defense practitioner, I have seen women lie from hatred or because they fear another man more than they fear the defendant. Some women do,
therefore, make false rape complaints. In my experience, however, women do not lie more
frequently about rape than about other matters. Nor do women in general lie more than men
in general.
75. See Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms, Feminist Reforms,
19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 127, 155-56 (1996).
76. Id. at 155.
77. Id. at 156.
78. Lisa R. Eskow, The Ultimate Weapon? Demythologizing Spousal Rape and Reconceptualizing its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REv. 677, 694 (1996) (quoting SUSAN ESTRICH,
REAL RAPE 72 (1987».
79. PUBLIC SAFETY REpORT, supra note 9, at 2 (emphasis added).
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considered that "[e]vidence admitted under this new section would be
subject to rational assessment by a jury as evidence concerning the probability or improbability that the defendant has been falsely or mistakenly
implicated in commission of [sic] charged offense. ,,80 The focus is on
bolstering the woman's credibility, rather than proving the defendant's
guilt.
In no other category of crime is the defendant's propensity to commit
the crime admissible. Perhaps, this is because in no other crime is the victim's testimony automatically suspect. California, along with other states,
has made a legislative statement, in section 411 of the California Evidence
81
Code, that the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated.
Section
1108 revives the corroboration requirement through the back door. It perpetuates the myth that the victim's credibility in sex cases is categorically
suspect.
In addition to undermining the credibility of rape victims, section 1108
may provide police and prosecutors an excuse not to prosecute sex offenses. Because of heavy caseloads, "[investigators] work from a profile
of the kind of case likely to get a conviction."s2 "[Victims] left out of that
profile are people of color, prostitutes, drug users and people raped by acquaintances,,,s3 in other words, those whose credibility is perceived to be
suspect. The availability of section 1108 evidence may well become part
of the "success profile," leading police and prosecutors to ignore cases
where it is not available. Thus, the state has an excuse not to prosecute
where there is no corroboration for a woman's complaint. Cases with no
section 1108 evidence look less winnable because those cases rely more
heavily on the victim's testimony.
B.

A DANGER TO THE INNOCENT

The implicit premise of section 1108 is that a complainant's testimony
needs corroboration. The explicit premise is that the defendant's character

80. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
81. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 411 (West 1995). This section does have some exceptions,
e.g., prohibiting the conviction of a defendant solely upon the testimony of an accomplice
(CAL. PENAL CODE § 1101), and another archaic expression for procuring abortion or luring
a girl under age eighteen into prostitution (CAL. PENAL CODE § 1108). Id. For other states'
statutes, see Hunter, supra note 75, at 167 n.199.
82. Candy J. Cooper, Nowhere to Tum for Rape Victims: High Proportion of Cases
Tossed Aside by Oakland Police, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 16,1990, at AI.
83. Id. In 1989, almost 25% of women who reported a rape to the Oakland, California
Police Department were told, in effect, that they were lying, even before their cases had
been investigated. The reports were closed and labeled "unfounded." Police said those
cases "were hopelessly tainted by women who are transient, uncooperative, untruthful or not
credible as witnesses in court." [d. After an investigation, police concluded that 90% percent of the cases labeled unfounded in 1989 and 1990 actually occurred. See Alix Christie,
Police Admit Error in Dismissed '89-'90 Rape Cases, OAKLAND TRIB., Feb. 2, 1991, at
All.
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provides that corroboration. "The propensity to commit sexual offenses is
not a common attribute among the general pUblic. Therefore, evidence that
a particular defendant has such a propensity is especially probative .... ,,84
Are prior bad acts probative of guilt in a current offense? That premise has
not been conclusively proven. Yet, jurors may give sexual character evidence undue emphasis. As a result, a defendant may be convicted because
of his perceived character when the evidence would otherwise not merit a
conviction.
The statute's premise that prior crimes evidence is probative, i.e., that
having previously committed one of the enumerated offenses, a defendant
is more likely to commit another sexual offense, is not necessarily born out
by recidivism studies. In a 1989 study from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, researchers measured re-arrest rates as a measure of recidivism. 85
Almost 32% of burglars were re-arrested for burglary, 24.8% of drug offenders were re-arrested for drug offenses, and 19.6% of violent robbers
were re-arrested for robbery.86 The recidivism rate for rape, at 7.7%, was
lower than all other crimes except homicide. 87 These figures contradict
bill author James Rogan's belief that prior sex-related crimes are probative
of current guilt. 88
Psychological research does not necessarily support the premise,
89
known as "trait theory," that character evidence predicts behavior. Trait
theory has been highly criticized in the last decade:
[E]mpirical research, however, has not only failed to validate trait
theory but has generally rejected it. 'The initial assumptions of
trait-state theory were logical, inherently plausible, and also consistent with common sense and intuitive impressions about personality. Their real limitation turned out to be empirical-they
simply have not been supported adequately.' Instead, the research
shows that behavior is largely shaped by situational determinants
84. PUBLIC SAFETY REpORT, supra note 9, at 2 (statement of Assemblyman James Rogan,
author of A.B. 882).
85. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense
Cases, 78 MINN. L. REv. 529, 572 n.182 (1994) (citing Allen J. Beck, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 19836 (1989».
86. See id.
87. See id. A 1997 Bureau of Justice Statistics study compared recidivism for any crime,
not just rape. It found that about 41 % of all violent offenders had been arrested for new
felonies but only 19.5% of rapists were arrested for a new crime. See Matthew Purdy,
States Taking Swift Action to Confine Sex Offenders, S.P. EXAMINER, June 29, 1997, at A8.
88. I was unable to find any support for the proposition that the other offenses enumerated in section 1108 were evidence of a particular trait of character. I invited Assemblyman
(now U.S. Congressman) Rogan's office to provide the source of his assertion about the
probative value of character evidence in sex crimes. No answer was ever provided.
89. See Miguel A. Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code
section 352 and Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1051-52
(1984) [hereinafter Mendez, California's New Law].
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that do not lend themselves easily to predictions about individual
behavior.90
Trait theory in the context of character evidence has been the subject
91
of numerous legal articles since 1984. Professor Mendez takes a strong
position that traditional trait theory has been discredited and recent research is too new to have practical application. 92 Others express varying
levels of confidence in trait theory.9 However, trait theorists "willingly
concede that they are unable to predict a single instance of behavior on a
particular occasion with confidence.,,94 In other words, one cannot rely on
a person's character traits to "accurately predict a single, isolated instance
of conduct" at issue in a criminal charge. 95
The research clearly shows that the more dissimilar the situation, the
96
less likely behavior will be consistent.
As noted by Mendez, "[e]ven
seemingly trivial situational differences may reduce correlations to zero.,,97
Bryden and Park conclude that "the character trait 'sex criminal,' a propensity to commit many different sex crimes, may not exist. Even the propensity to commit a specific sex crime such as rape may be situational.,,98

90. Id. (quoting WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 6, 22 (1968)).
91. See, e.g., Bryden & Park, supra note 85; Mark Cammack, Using the Doctrine of
Chances to Prove Actus Reus in Child Abuse and Acquaintance Rape: People v. Ewoldt
Reconsidered, 29 U.c. DAVIS L. REv. 355 (1996); David Crump, How Should We Treat
Character Evidence Offered to Prove Conduct? 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 279 (1987); Susan
Marlene Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy,
27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504 (1991); Donald A. Dripps, Relevant but Prejudicial Exculpatory
Evidence: Rationality Versus Jury Trial and the Right to Put on a Defense, 69 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1389 (1996); David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality
and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1986-87); Mendez, California's New Law, supra note 89; Miguel A. Mendez, The Law of Evidence and the Search for
a Stable Personality, 45 EMORY L.J. 221 (1996) [hereinafter Mendez, Search for a Stable
Personality]; David Ring, Comment, Rush to Judgment: Criminal Propensity Clothed as
Credibility Evidence in the Post-Proposition 8 Era of California Criminal Law, 15
WHITTIERL. REv. 241 (1994).
92. See Mendez, California's New Law, supra note 89, at 1051-52; Mendez, Search for a
Stable Personality, supra note 91, at 227-28.
93. See, e.g., Cammack, supra note 91, at 400 (rejecting "crude global character trait
theories which posit general character traits assumed to produce consistent conduct in diverse situations" and discussing non-character purposes for similar crimes evidence); Mendez, Search for a Stable Personality, supra note 91, at 233,237 (proposing a more sophisticated theory which shows some correlation of behavior across situations, though not the
direct correspondence which trait theorists expected, and recognizing that if the new theory
were capable of predicting behavior, it would require expert testimony to explain the variables involved).
94. Davies, supra note 91, at 517.
95. Leonard, supra note 91, at 29.
96. See Mendez, California'S New Law, supra note 89, at 1052.
97. Id.
98. Bryden & Park, supra note 85, at 563. Despite acknowledging that trait theory has
not been proven, they nevertheless advocate the relevance of such evidence. "Unless one
knows that this propensity does not extend to the situation in which the crime charged alleg-
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The research supports what the California Supreme Court ruled in
99
People v. Steele.
In Steele, the court held that a woman's prior sexual
conduct was not admissible to prove her current sexual conduct. lOO Just
because a woman consents to sex in one context, does not mean that she
will consent again. Just because a man committed a sex-related offense
does not mean that he will commit one again. 101 We cannot assume that a
person always acts the same way, even if that provides us a comforting
way of viewing the world. Similarly, we cannot assume there is a charac. to commIt
. sex-re1atedcnmes.
'
102
ter .,:lor the propensIty
There is little empirical basis for the assumption that prior acts prove
propensity to commit future crime. There is, however, empirical evidence
that juries may convict based on character evidence, instead of evidence of
the current crime. 103
The real danger in admission of character evidence is that
the jury will give the evidence more weight than it deserves, either by overestimating its probative value on the
crime charged or by concluding that even if the defendant
is innocent of the crime charged, he is a 'bad man' who
"
'1 . 104
be1ongs lllJaI
The danger of convicting the innocent is greatest in stranger rape cases
edly occurred, his prior rapes are relevant evidence of his guilt." Id. On the contrary, given
the ambivalence about trait theory in the literature, the weight that jurors give bad character
evidence, the presumption of innocence in criminal cases, and any doubts about whether
propensity extends to a particular situation should be resolved against relevance. Bryden
and Park do suggest that "[t]he key, perhaps, is not the intrinsic reliability of character
analysis but the sophistication with which one attempts to infer propensity." Id. Section
1108, which permits using a prior indecent exposure charge to prove propensity to commit
sodomy, makes no pretensions to sophistication.
99. 210 Cal. App. 3d 67.
100. Id. at 76. For an analysis of the court's reasoning, see discussion supra pp. 107-108.
101. This is particularly true when the two crimes are unrelated as with indecent exposure
and sodomy.
102. It is often difficult to distinguish between character for committing an offense and
Evidence Code section 11 Ol (b) (evidence admissible as evidence of lack of mistake, intent,
modus operandi or lack of good faith belief in consent). In child molestation cases particularly, that line has become blurred. For instance, prior offenses of forced oral copulation on
a minor were held relevant to show common design or plan in a prosecution for lewd and
lascivious conduct upon a child in which the main issue was whether the acts described by
the victim occurred. See People v. Dancer, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1677, 1688-89 (1996). In another case, photographs which the defendant possessed of young boys and other pedophiliac
pornography were admitted to show intent to molest a young boy. See People v. Memro, 11
Cal. 4th 786, 861-62 (1995). The court held that though the photographs themselves were
not explicit, the jury could infer from them that the defendant had a sexual attraction to
young boys and proceeded to act on it. See id.
103. See Mendez, California's New Law, supra note 89, at 1045 ("[J]urors may give
greater weight to evidence of misconduct and dishonesty than to favorable evidence.").
104. Bryden & Park, supra note 85, at 565.
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where the defense is misidentification. The prosecution will use the character evidence to argue that it cannot be a coincidence that the person
identified has a history of sex-related crimes. The jury will believe the
identification is corroborated and so convict. However, eyewitness identification can be very unreliable. lOS The media report numerous examples of
men wrongly convicted in identification cases who were exonerated by
DNA evidence, often after years of imprisonment. 106
Our justice system cannot rely on physical evidence to save someone
from a wrongful conviction. The constitutional burden falls in the other
direction. The government carries the burden of proving the identity of the
defendant and should not be allowed to use character evidence indirectly to
show identity. The focus should be on the accuracy of the identification.
The danger of admitting character evidence lies in the possibility that juries will convict based on the character of a defendant without testing the
sufficiency of the identification.
C.

A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS

Prior to the enactment of rape shield laws, a complainant was at risk of
having her sexual history dragged into the public arena. Because her history was considered relevant to show her character, defense attorneys had
the ethical obligation to gain whatever knowledge they could about her
private life. 107 Now, however, rape shield laws protect women by allowing
them to fress a complaint while knowing that their privacy remains pro10
tected.
Section 1108, however, does not protect women. Some Inay argue that
making convictions in sex cases easier for the prosecution benefits women.

105. See, e.g., Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 975-88 (1977).
106. See Man Cleared of Rape By DNA is Pardoned, L.A TIMES, Oct. 9, 1997, at A24;
Bruce Cadwallader, Inmate Walks After Eleven Years. COLUMBUS DISPATCH (OHIO), Dec. 7,
1996, at AI; Dave Harmon, DNA Test Casts Doubt On Rape Verdict, AUSTIN AM.STATESMAN, Sept. 25, 1997, at AI; Mike Smith, Nearly Three Decades Later, DNA Proves
Man was Wrongly Convicted, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Aug. 4, 1997, at 1.
It must be acknowledged that historically, rape allegations have been used for political, especially racist, purposes. "[T]he rape charge has been indiscriminately aimed at
Black men, the guilty and the innocent alike." ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS
172 (1983). Between 1930 and 1967, 405 of the 455 men executed for rape were black.
See id. See also Friedman, supra note 63, at 1368 n.103 (referring to the Bureau of Prisons
National Prisoner Statistics No. 45, Capital Punishment 1930 - 1968). The Scottsboro Boys
trial, in which nine young southern black men were accused of raping two white women, is
merely the most notorious example. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). For further discussion, see Sakthi Murphy, Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectation: Limits on

using a Rape Victim's Sexual History to Show the Defendant's Mistaken Belief in Consent,
79 CAL. L. REv. 541, 576 n.32 (1991).
107. See Peter M. Hazelton, Rape Shield Laws: Limits on Zealous Advocacy, AM. J. CRIM.
L. 35, 40 (1991).
108. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(c)(l).
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But that benefit comes at the cost of constitutional principles which protect
us alL Exclusion of character evidence is based on due process notions of
fundamental justice 109 and the right to a fair triaL 110 The risk of conviction
based on a jury's perception that the defendant is of bad character undermines the presumption of innocence and lessens the state's burden of proof
of the crime. A person should be tried based on facts, not on speculation,
prejudice, or fear.
The United States Supreme Court has never directly decided whether
using prior crimes as character evidence violates due process. In Spencer
v. Texas, however, the question came before the Court in the context of a
habitual offender law. 1 Il The issue was whether using prior convictions in
the prosecution's case in chief to prove a defendant was a habitual offender
violated due process. 112 Three defendants were charged with being recidivist offenders under a Texas statute which allowed the jury to enhance
113
The convicthe defendant's sentence if he had previous convictions.
tions were admitted into evidence during the prosecution's case in chief.114
However, the juries were each instructed that they could not use the prior
convictions as evidence of guilt of the charges for which the defendants
. tne
. d .115.
were currentIy b elng
A divided Court held that use of the prior convictions did not offend
116
The majority opinion noted that it did not necesdue process principles.
sarily consider the Texas statute the wisest or fairest way to prove recidivism and that it might prefer a two-step trial which introduced the prior
convictions only after the jury had determined guilt of the charges alleged. 1l7 Yet, it cited its traditional hesitance to dictate rules of criminal
procedure to the states as a reason to refrain from finding that the Texas
. Iate d d ue process. 118
statutes VlO
The Court also noted that prior crimes evidence may be introduced for
other legitimate purposes, such as to prove intent or to rebut the defen119
dant's credibility after he testifies.
The Court acknowledged the legitimate purpose of recidivist statutes-to punish habitual criminals more se109. See Michelson v. U.S., 335 U.S. 469,475-76 (1948).
110. See McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993); Henry v. Estelle, 993
F.2d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir. 1993); Jarnmal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918,920 (9th Cir.
1991).
Ill. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 557-60 (1967).
112. Seeid.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 563-65.
117. See id. at 564-65. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Stewart both agreed that the twostep trial method was "far superior" to Texas' method as a way to decrease potential prejudice. Id. at 569 (Stewart, J., concurring), 579-80 (Warren, J., concurring and dissenting).
118. See id. at 568.
119. See id. at 560.
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verely.120 The Court reasoned that the admission of prior convictions for
purposes of proving recidivism was a legitimate state purpose outweighing
the acknowledged prejudice which prior crimes evidence creates. 121
The main difference between Spencer and section 1108 is that in
Spencer, prior convictions were not admitted for the purpose of proving
the defendants' bad character. 122 All three juries were instructed that they
may not consider the conviction as evidence of the defendant's guilt or in123
The very purpose of
nocence of the charge for which he was on trial.
section 1108, on the other hand, is to use prior acts as character evidence to
prove the defendant's guilt. 124
Further, the Spencer majority noted that the sort of evidence introduced to show a conviction is "usually, and in recidivist cases almost always, of a documentary kind.,,12S That is, the prosecution introduces the
docket to prove the conviction. The Court pointed out that "in the cases
before us there is no claim that its presentation was in any way inflammatory.,,126 Yet, section 1108 seems to permit live witnesses and physical
evidence, photographs, and whatever else the prosecution considers necessary to prove the uncharfed prior bad acts regardless of the inflammatory
nature of the evidence. 12
Chief Justice Warren, in his dissent and concurrence, pointed out that
the majority in Spencer "never faces up to the problem" of whether using
prior convictions as evidence of criminal propensity to prove guilt would
I28
He powerfully demonstrated that it would. First, he
violate due process.
noted that recidivist statutes have never been thought to allow the State to
use prior convictions to show probability of guilt. 129 "The fact of prior
convictions is not intended to make it any easier for the State to prove the
commission of a subsequent crime.,,130 He argued that if it were so, the
statutes would violate the Due Process Clause:
Whether or not a State has recidivist statutes on its books, it is well
established that evidence of prior convictions may not be used by
the State to show that the accused has a criminal disposition and
that the probability that he committed the crime currently charged
120. See id. at 556.
121. See id. at 566-69.
122. Nor was unproven evidence admitted. The Spencer Court was considering only prior
convictions, not mere allegations, as section 1108 allows. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 558.
123. See id. at 557-60. Note that three cases were consolidated upon appeal. See id. at
555.
124. See CRIM. PROC. REPORT, supra note 6.
125. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 562.
126. Id.
127. See CAL. EVlD. CODE § 1108(b).
128. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 571 (Warren, C.J., dissenting and concurring).
129. See id.
130. Id.
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is increased. While this Court has never held that the use of prior
convictions to show nothing more than a disposition to commit
crime would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, our decisions exercising supervisory power over
criminal trials in federal courts, as well as decisions by courts of
appeals and of state courts, suggest that evidence of prior crimes
introduced for no purpose other than to show criminal disposition
would violate the Due Process Clause. 131
Chief Justice Warren further concluded that using prior crimes as evidence of criminal propensity is unconstitutional because it interferes with
the defendant's ability to have a fair trial:
Evidence of prior convictions has been forbidden because it jeopardizes the presumption of innocence of the crime currently
charged. A jury might punish an accused for being guilty of a
previous offense, or feel that incarceration is justified because the
accused is a "bad man," without regard to his guilt of the crime
currently charged. Of course it flouts human nature to suppose
that a jury would not consider a defendant's previous trouble with
the law in deciding whether he has committed the crime currently
charged against him. As Mr. Justice Jackson put it in a famous
phrase, "[t]he naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers
know to be unmitigated fiction.,,132
Chief Justice Warren also pointed out the illogic involved in the majority's assertion that because recidivist statutes have a legitimate purpose,
just as there is a legitimate purpose in admitting prior convictions for noncharacter uses, admitting the prior conviction to show recidivism outweighs any prejudice to the defendant. l33 He noted that this apparently
plausible syllogism fails because the two premises together do not add up
134
.. ,
1.
to th e maJonty s conc USlon:
I believe the Court has fallen into the logical fallacy sometimes
known as the fallacy of the undistributed middle, because it has
failed to examine the supposedly shared principle between admission of prior crimes related to guilt and admission in connection
with recidivist statutes. That the admission in both situations may
serve a valid purpose does not demonstrate that the former practice
justifies the latter any more than the fact that men and dogs are
131. Id. at 572-74.
132. Id. at 575 (quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,453 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring».
133. See id.
134. See id. at 577-78.
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animals means that men and dogs are the same in all respects. 135
Chief Justice Warren concluded that the majority allowed its approval
of recidivist statutes' goals to cloud its judgment about whether the statutes
were constitutional. 136 The same danger confronts us with section 1108.
No one argues with the proposition that it is right to convict sex offenders.
However, such an emotionally powerful argument begs the question of
whether admission of prior bad acts to show character is the proper way to
obtain convictions. Because of the potential for reducing the prosecution's
burden and the violence such evidence does to the presumption of innocence, the admission of this evidence is more likely to result in convictions
of the innocent, as well as the guilty.
Two federal cases illustrate how the United States Courts of Appeal
have dealt with the use of prior bad acts to show character. 137 Both found
that doing so violated due process principles. 138 The first, Lovely v. United
States, involved the same kind of circumstances to which section 1108
139
140
applies.
A woman alleged she had been raped.
The defendant admitted they had sex, but claimed it was consensual. 141 Consent was the only
issue in the trial. 142 Over defense objections, the trial court allowed the
testimony of another woman who alleged that he had raped her fifteen days
before the rape for which he was on trial. 143 On direct appeal, the court rel44
It noted:
versed.
[T]he only question was whether he had had carnal knowledge of
her forcibly and against her will. The fact, if it was a fact, that he
had ravished another woman some weeks before, threw no light
whatever on that question. It showed merely that he was a bad
man, likely to commit that sort of crime; and this is precisely what
the prosecution is not allowed to show in a criminal case. 145
The court held:
The rule which thus forbids that introduction of evidence of other
offenses having no reasonable tendency to prove the crime

135. Id. at 578-79.
136. Id. at 579-80.
137. See Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 1948); Panzavecchia v.
Wainwright, 658 F.2d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1981). See also McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d at
1385.
138. See Love(v, 169 F.2d at 389; Panzavecchia, 658 F.2d at 350-54.
139. 169 F. 2d at 388-89.
140. See id. at 388.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 391.
145. [d. at 388.
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charged, except insofar as they may establish a criminal tendency
on the part of the accused, is not a mere technical rule of law. It
arises out of the fundamental demand for justice and fairness
which lies at the basis of our jurisprudence. If such evidence were
allowed, not only would the time of courts be wasted in the trial of
collateral issues, but persons accused of crime would be greatly
prejudiced before juries and would be otherwise embarrassed in
. th·
.
. I. 146
presentmg
elr de f enses on the Issues
reaII y on tna
In the second case, Panzavecchia v. Wainwright, the court considered a
writ of habeas corpus from a state court case in which the defendant had
been simu1taneously tried for first degree murder and for being a felon in
possession of a firearm. 147 The defense motion for severance of the
charges had been denied. 148 The prosecution introduced evidence of the
defendant's prior counterfeiting charge in order to prove the felon in pos. 0 f a f·Ire arm ch arge. 149
seSSIOn
The Fifth Circuit held that the cases should have been severed. 150 The
effect of admitting the prior conviction for the firearm was to permit evidence in the murder case that, in the context of that charge, was nothing
more than propensity evidence. 151 It concluded that admitting the evidence
as merely propensity evidence violated the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 152
[T]he counterfeiting conviction . . . was totally irrelevant to the
murder charge and the only purpose it served was to show bad
character and propensity to commit a crime. Had the two offenses
been tried separately, the counterfeiting conviction would never be
admitted in the murder trial. . .. The prejudice which Florida and
the federal courts have proscribed clearly existed and this prejudice rose to such a level as to make the petitioner's trial fundamentally unfair and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 153
If evidence of a prior conviction violated due process, then so must
evidence where there was no conviction. If evidence of a guilty plea or
conviction is so highly prejudicial as to deny the defendant a fair trial, then
evidence of unproven allegations must have the same prejudicial effect
without any assurance of reliability. 154

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

ld. at 389.
658 F.2d at 388-89.
See id. at 338.
See id.
See id. at 341.
See id.
See id. at 338.
ld. at 341.
This analysis depends, of course, on the particularly prejudicial nature of pure charac-
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Allowing states to use sex crime propensjty evidence also violates due
process in another way; it violates the reciprocity requirement. Reciprocity
simply means that the defendant should be allowed the same rights to present evidence as the prosecution enjoys. The United States Supreme Court,
in Wardius v. Oregon, recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment right to
due process incorporates the right to reciprocity. 155 The Court stated, "the
Due Process Clause . . . does speak to the balance of forces between the
accused and his accuser.,,156 It added, "[t]his Court has therefore been particularly suspicious of state trial rules which provide nonreciprocal benefits
to the State when the lack of reciprocity interferes with the defendant's
ability to secure a fair trial.,,157 Thus, the Court held that a rule requiring
the defense to give notice of alibi witnesses without a reciprocal requirement that the prosecution disclose its witnesses violated due process. 158
In making its ruling, the Wardius Court relied in part on Gideon v.
Wainright, the seminal case holding that a criminal defendant has the right
to an attorney. 159 One reason the Gideon Court gave for its holding was
that if the State has a lawyer, the defendant is entitled to have one, too. 160
The Wardius Court also relied on Washington v. Texas, which held that the
State could not limit the defendant's right to call witnesses. 161 Referring to
England's history of prohibiting defense witnesses, the Washington Court
noted that the Framers of the Constitution felt it necessary to provide defendants the right to compulsory process of the court "so that their own
evidence, as well as the prosecution's, might be evaluated by the jury." 162
Several California cases have recognized that the right of reciprocity
extends to the reciprocal right to introduce evidence. In Evans v. Superior
Court, the California Supreme Court recognized the right of the defendant
to hold a line-up for purposes of introducing exculpatory evidence on the
issue of identification. 163 "Because the People are in a position to compel a
line-up and utilize what favorable evidence is derived therefrom, fairness
requires that the accused be given a reciprocal right to discover and utilize
contrary evidence."I64
ter evidence. If there is a permissible use of the evidence, such as using prior bad acts to
show motive, intent, etc., erroneous admission of that evidence would not violate due process. See Dowling v. U.S., 493 U.S. 342, 350-54 (1990) (holding that introduction of evidence relating to crime that defendant had previously been acquitted of committing did not
violate double jeopardy or due process).
155. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 (1973).
156. Id. at 474.
157. Id. at n.6.
158. See id. at 472.
159. Id. at 474 n.6; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
160. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343.
161. Wardius, 412 U.S. at 474; Washington v. Texas, 308 U.S. 14,23 (1863).
162. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19.
163. Evans v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 617,625 (1974).
164. Id. at 623.
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Similarly, the defendant has a right to introduce hearsay evidence
through a police officer, since the same right has been granted to the State
under Penal Code section 872(b).165 The California Supreme Court first
addressed the issue in Whitman v. Superior Court which, while discussing
a related issue, intimated in dicta that it might allow the defendant to call a
police officer to testify to hearsay because the prosecution had the same
right. 166 When directly faced with the issue, the Court of Appeal concluded that the right of reciprocity meant the defense had the right to introduce the same kind of hearsay evidence as the State. 167
The rule of reciprocity should also apply to the use of character evidence. The purpose is the same: to ensure basic fairness and enable the
defendant to mount a complete defense. In People v. Hansel, the California Supreme Court stated that:
The reciprocal pretrial discovery required in Wardius and Evans
helps defendants to present their defense. Without equal access to
any favorable evidence, defendants would be placed at a disadvantage in relation to the state, and their ability either to demonstrate
their own innocence or to avoid unfair surprise at trial would be
reduced. The nonreciprocal procedures addressed in Wardius and
Evans, therefore, directly implicate the right of the accused to a
fair trial, even though the proceedings at issue occur before trial. 168
Wardius and its progeny recognized that what one side may do, the
other side may do as well. Now, section 1108 opens the door to defense
attorneys seeking to introduce a complainant's sexual history. If a defendant's character is probative and admissible, so therefore is a complainant's. In our attempt to secure the conviction of sex offenders, we may
have made women less secure.
There are only three ways out of this conundrum. We can weaken the
rape shield laws so that a woman's character is again admissible in sexual
assault cases, to give defendants reciprocity with prosecutors; choose to
protect rape shield laws by undermining the principle of due process and
fundamental fairness in a jury trial; or finally, determine that section 1108
is unconstitutionally infirm. In practice, using section 1108 will lead to
injustice for someone-will it be women or the accused?

V. CONCLUSION
Section 1108 was unnecessary because legitimate, non-character use of

165. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b) (West 1985).
166. Whitman v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 1063, 1082 (1991).
167. See Nienhouse v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 83, 91 (1996). See also Garcia v.
Superior Court, 1 Cal. App. 4th 979 (1991).
168. People v. Hansel, 1 Cal. 4th 1211, 1221 (1992).
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prior crimes evidence was already available to the prosecution. Yet, in the
quest to ensure convictions, the California Legislature, like Congress, has
dramatically and precipitously eradicated hundreds of years of common
law prohibitions against the use of character evidence. Section 1108 undermines due process, endangers the presumption of innocence, and imperils the protections victims have gained in sex crimes cases. Bolstering
the credibility of complainants may have seemed like a good idea at the
time, but its consequences will be severe.

